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Current policies in the road transport sector fail to deliver consistent and efficient incentives for 
greenhouse  gas  abatement  (see  companion  article  by  Creutzig  et  al.,  2010a).  Market-based 
instruments  such  as  cap-and-trade  systems  close  this  policy  gap  and  are  complementary  to 
traditional policies which are required where specific market failures arise. Even in presence of 
strong existing non-market policies, cap-and-trade delivers additional abatement and efficiency by 
incentivizing  demand  side  abatement  options.  This  paper  analyzes  generic  design  options  and 
economic impacts of including the European road transport sector to the EU ETS. The point of 
regulation in a road transport cap-and-trade system should be upstream in the fuel chain to ensure 
effectiveness (cover all life-cycle emissions and avoid double-counting), efficiency (incentivize all 
abatement options) and low transaction costs.  Based on year 2020 marginal abatement cost curves 
from  different  models  and  current  EU  climate  policy  objectives  we  show  that  in  contrast  to   3 
conventional wisdom road transport inclusion would not change the EU ETS allowance price. This 
puts concerns over industrial carbon leakage as a consequence of adding road transport to the EU 
ETS into perspective.  
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1. Introduction 
Road  transport  greenhouse  gas  emissions  are  rising  around  the  world  (IEA,  2008,  2009). 
Ambitious  climate  policy  objectives  such  as  limiting  global  warming  to  2°C  (UNFCCC  2009) 
require  substantial  emission  reductions  in  all  economic  sectors,  including  road  transportation 
(Luderer et al., 2010; Creutzig and Edenhofer, 2010). Decarbonizing the road transport sector will 
require  new  technologies  and  alternative  fuel  chains  potentially  including  biofuels,  electricity, 
natural gas or hydrogen.  
A companion article by Creutzig et al. (2010a) provides an overview of life-cycle emissions 
of  alternative  road  transport  fuel  chains.  The  article  explores  the  consequences  of  fuel  chain 
diversification for an effective and efficient road transport climate policy portfolio and reviews 
major current policies. The main finding is that current road transport policies in Europe, the United 
States and China have proved effective in reducing emissions but fail to set consistent incentives 
across all abatement options. Market-based instruments such as a carbon taxation or cap-and-trade 
system would close the prevailing gap in the climate policy portfolio, while traditional non-market 
policies  will  continue  to  play  an  important  complementary  role  in  addressing  market  failures 
beyond the greenhouse gas externality.  
Several world regions including the United States, California, Japan, Canada, Australia, or 
New Zealand are discussing or implementing cap-and-trade systems that would include the road 
transport sector in an economy-wide trading system (Kossoy and Ambrosi, 2010). The EU Emission 
Trading System (EU ETS) does not include road transport but will cover aviation from 2013 (EC, 
2008b). Against this background, this article reviews the theoretic rationale and practical design of 
cap-and-trade for the road transport sector and provides an empirical assessment of road transport 
inclusion to the EU ETS.   5 
Peer-reviewed analyses of road transport inclusion to cap-and-trade are scarce. Raux (2005) 
focuses  on  a  scheme  covering  final  fuel  consumers  despite  the  substantial  transaction  costs 
associated with regulating millions of actors. Studies published as gray literature almost consistently 
omit the diversification of fuel chains (Creutzig et al., 2010b). 
  The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  2  reviews  the  merits  and 
demerits of market- and non-market-based policies for regulating road transport emissions. Building 
on the finding that market-based policies are an essential part of the road transport climate policy 
portfolio, Section 3 analyzes the relative merits of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems. As cap-
and-trade is preferable under empirically plausible conditions, section 4 discusses key design issues 
in  cap-and-trade  implementation  in  the  road  transport  sector,  in  particular  the  optimal  point  of 
regulation. Section 5 compares price and quantity effects of road transport integration into the EU 
ETS when using marginal abatement cost curves from several models. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Market-based versus non-market instruments 
Implementing market-based instruments such as carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems to 
put a price on greenhouse gas emissions is a standard economic prescription in climate policy 
(Kalkuhl and Edenhofer, 2010; Nordhaus, 2008; Stern, 2007). A properly designed carbon price 
internalizes the emission externality and, in theory, incentivize all abatement options up to the same 
marginal costs of abatement (MAC). Therefore, market-based instruments are particularly suited for 
efficient climate policy. If the carbon price is credibly announced to persist over time, it will also 
foster  dynamic  efficiency  as  it  stimulates  research  and  development  (R&D)  efforts,  market 
introduction of new technologies, and longer term behavioral adjustment (Edenhofer et al., 2006). 
Market-based instruments enable the regulator to directly control emission levels, either via an   6 
emission cap or an adjustable carbon tax. From an industry perspective, a carbon price that is 
harmonized within and across sectors creates a level ‘carbon playing field’ for all firms. Market-
based instruments enable the regulator to harmonize marginal abatement costs without need for 
assembling detailed techno-economic information which reduces the informational requirements.  
Non-market instruments such as technology standards, by contrast, will typically address only 
specific abatement options and face difficulties in guaranteeing that marginal abatement costs are 
harmonized within and across sectors (Creutzig et al., 2010a). Some options for abatement may be 
harnessed  at  suboptimal  levels  or  even  not  at  all,  while  others  can  become  implemented  at 
disproportionally high cost (Böhringer et al., 2009). Also, efficiency-improving standards suffer 
from rebound effects as they reduce the marginal cost of transportation (Small and Van Dender, 
2007). Finally, to set non-market policies efficiently the regulator needs to draw on reliable techno-
economic information.  
However, carbon pricing is not a panacea and non-market policies have an important role to 
play. Where market or government imperfections arise in addition to the basic climate externality–
e.g. knowledge spillovers in research and development of low-carbon fuels and vehicles (Jaffe et 
al.,  2005),  or  lack  of  policy  credibility  (Brunner  et  al.,  2010a)–carbon  pricing  cannot  achieve 
optimal  outcomes  and  complementary  standards  have  an  important  role  to  play  (Fischer  and 
Newell, 2008). The basic reason is that the number of policy objectives (e.g. internalization of 
externalities) needs to be matched by the number of policy instruments (Knudson, 2009; Tinbergen, 
1952). In many cases a single policy instrument cannot be specified so as to optimally address each 
of several market failures. This also implies that introduction of market-based instruments will 
require checking the configuration of standards to ensure that the portfolio of policy instruments 
properly addresses the ensemble of market- and government failures (Fischer and Newell, 2008).   7 
Given the presently heavy reliance on non-market road transport policies in the European 
Union, the United States and other world regions (Creutzig et al., 2010a), market-based instruments 
can  be  regarded  as  tools  that  close  the  policy  space  by  systematically  setting  an  incentive  for 
harnessing all available abatement options. But there are also less optimistic views of applying 
market-based instruments in the road transport sector. We examine these in the following section.  
 
2.1 Arguments against market-based regulation  
Adverse interaction with existing fuel taxes  
Paltsev et al. (2004) and Abrell (2009) argue that in presence of high existing road transport 
fuel taxes–especially in Europe–further fuel tax increases due to carbon pricing are not expedient 
from an economic perspective. In Germany, aggregate gasoline taxes (mineral oil tax plus VAT) 
amounted to 0.85€/liter (2.59$/gal) on average in 2009 (MWV 2010). This corresponds to 367€ 
(455$) per ton of CO2 contained in gasoline.
1  
However,  governments  need  to  raise  revenue  to  finance  public  goods  (including  road 
infrastructure). Clearly, this raises politically sensitive issues about the proper role of the state and 
the distribution of the fiscal burden across sectors and social groups. In addition, road transport 
generates  several  negative  externalities  that  can  be  addressed  by  Pigovian  fuel  taxation. 
Specification of the optimal level tax level thus requires an assessment of negative externalities 
such as noise, accidents, congestion, energy security, and possibly even the less tangible cost of 
geopolitical conflicts related to energy security including the Middle East (Parry et al., 2007). The 
monetary  evaluation  of  these  externalities  necessarily  involves  normative  elements  and  raises 
political  questions  that  cannot  be  fully  resolved  by  scientific  inquiry,  making  specification  of 
optimal fuel tax levels contested. Conceptually, if externalities are not correlated with each other the   8 
optimal fuel tax is equal to the sum of marginal costs of the externalities, and a carbon tax would 
simply be added to the aggregate Pigovian tax (Newbery, 1992). 
Hence, the aggregate optimal transport fuel tax results from combining fiscal and Pigovian 
fuel tax elements (Parry and Small, 2005). Whether a price on carbon should be added on top of the 
pre-existing tax level in a specific country to yield the optimal level of fuel taxation is an empirical 
question involving contested evaluations. Some analysts find that present European Union fuel tax 
levels are not justified by transport externalities and general taxation requirements (e.g. Paltsev et 
al., 2004; Parry and Small, 2005) while others consider EU fuel taxes as too low (Sterner, 2007; 
Proost et al., 2009). In the United States, fuel taxes are much lower than in Europe at around 
0.08€/liter (0.24$/gal) (EIA 2010) and there is agreement that this level is not overly high (Paltsev 
et al., 2004), with some analysts arguing that US fuel taxes should be raised (Parry and Small, 
2005). This paper assumes that governments must view current taxes to be optimal, otherwise they 
would have changed them (Newbery, 1992). Where carbon taxes are not already implemented, a 
price on carbon would add to the current fuel tax.  
 
Redundancy and lack of impact 
With ambitious non-market road transport regulation in place in several world regions it is 
sometimes argued that market-based policies may be redundant in achieving emission reduction 
targets  (Kågesson,  2008).  Indeed,  our  analysis  of  emission  reductions  from  standards  in  the 
European Union and United States in Section 5.3 shows that substantial reduction can be expected. 
However, with incomplete information there may be unanticipated abatement potentials that are not 
captured  by  standards  but  would  be  induced  by  carbon  pricing.  More  importantly,  even  a 
combination of standards will likely fail to incentivize all available abatement options, in particular   9 
demand side reductions. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Based on data from CE Delft (Blom et al., 
2007) it displays an aggregate marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) for the EU road transport 
sector and its decomposition into cost effective technical (vehicle efficiency and fuel switching 
options)  and  behavioral  responses  to  carbon  pricing.  Even  if  standards  induced  all  technical 
abatement options the demand side MAC is still elastic with respect to carbon pricing.  
 
 
Figure 2: CE Delft year 2020 marginal abatement cost curve for the EU road transport sector and its 
disaggregation into technical and behavioral cost curves.  
 
It is sometimes argued that the behavioral response to gasoline fuel price increases of 0.035-
0.07 €/liter (0.10-0.20$/gal) resulting from a carbon prices of 15-30€ (19-37$) per ton CO2e are ‘too 
small’ to trigger ‘substantial’ quantities of abatement (Ellerman et al., 2010, p.22). But empirical 
studies of fuel price elasticities show that on aggregate people and companies do indeed respond to 
fuel price changes, with short-term elasticities of 0.25 and long-term elasticities of 0.64 (Goodwin 
et al., 2004; a price elasticity of 0.25 means that 1% fuel price increase lead to 0.25% reduction of   10 
fuel demand). In addition, classifying price increases as ‘small’ requires a benchmark. One proper 
benchmark is the price that is required to achieve the environmental benchmark. With a cap-and-
trade system in place the amount of emissions is determined by the cap, and the carbon price will 
adjust automatically to ensure goal attainment (alternatively, a carbon tax can be adjusted to achieve 
a quantity goal). If ‘low’ carbon prices suffice to meet the environmental target this is not a sign of 
climate policy failure but an indication of sufficient low-cost abatement options in the system. 
Specification of the environmental target is an important but separate question from that of policy 
instrument choice. A bottom-up rationale on the complementary between market-based on non-
market-based  instruments  in  road  transport  climate  regulation  is  given  in  the  companion  paper 
(Creutzig et al., 2010a).  
 
Dynamic efficiency 
Non-marginal technological change will be required to decarbonize the transport sector in the 
21
st  century.  Under  perfect  market  assumptions  long-term  carbon  caps  or  taxes  will  provide 
sufficient incentives to foster low-carbon technological change (Edenhofer et al., 2010; Luderer et 
al., 2010). But perfect markets and governments are not in place and hence the dynamic efficiency 
of carbon pricing schedules is compromised. It is crucial to note that such imperfections do not 
remove the basic rationale for market-based policies in the first place. They rather open the policy 
space  for  complementary  policies–aiming  for  dynamic  efficiency–such  as  standards,  R&D 
subsidies, and infrastructure investments.  
 
3. Taxes versus cap-and-trade   11 
In  a  simple  framework  carbon  taxes  and  cap-and-trade  are  equivalent  instruments.  The 
theoretical  literature  has  discussed  asymmetries  arising  under  uncertainty  (Hepburn,  2006; 
Weitzman, 1974) or considerations of supply side dynamics (Kalkuhl and Edenhofer, 2010; Sinn, 
2008). Section 3.1 reviews arguments that would favor taxes over trading for road transportation 
climate policy. The arguments draw on considerations of carbon leakage and transaction costs. 
Section  3.2  then  outlines  the  argument  that  cap-and-trade  has  advantages  over  taxation  under 
specific but plausible conditions.  
 
3.1 Arguments favoring taxes  
In the EU context, including the growing transport sector with its relatively steep abatement 
cost curve into the EU ETS is suspected to prompt EU allowance (EUA) prices to rise, thereby 
causing carbon leakage in trade-exposed sectors already covered by the EU ETS (Blom et al., 2007; 
Holmgren et al., 2006; Kampmann et al., 2008; Kågesson, 2008). A road transport carbon tax would 
avoid this detrimental general equilibrium effect as it will have no impact on the EUA price.  
It is useful to explicate the conditions that need to be met for rendering this argument into a 
valid public policy concern: 
1.  The allowance price change induced by road transport inclusion is significant. 
2.  The carbon price elasticity of leakage is significant, i.e. an increasing allowance price leads 
to substantial leakage effects. These rates are largely unknown and methodically difficult to 
determine.  
3.  No policy instrument exists which could mitigate carbon leakage risk.    12 
4.  The welfare loss from carbon leakage is larger than the efficiency gain from harmonizing 
marginal abatement costs, and a transport carbon tax better balances domestic efficiency and 
carbon leakage concerns.  
This paper only addresses the first concern over an increasing allowance price in the European 
case (Section 5). We find that for relevant EU climate policy configurations an EUA price increase 
from road transport integration to the EU ETS is not relevant.  
  Another argument is that transaction costs of road transport inclusion will be very high, in 
particular when final consumers are the point of regulation (Ecofys, 2006). However, upstream 
coverage will contain transaction costs and should not exceed those of current EU ETS facilities, 
where they are not found to be prohibitive (Ellerman et al., 2010, pp. 245; see also Section 4). Also, 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) are required for both carbon taxation and cap-and-
trade, and the related transaction costs are identical. An asymmetry arises only from the costs of 
establishing a well-functioning carbon market which will be lower where such a system is already 
in place (e.g. the EU ETS). 
 
3.2 Arguments favoring cap-and-trade 
Three observations motivate the argument of this subsection: (1) marginal abatement costs 
are uncertain, (2) policymakers prefer quantitative emission targets and (3) sometimes implement 
cap-and-trade in other sectors of the economy. To illustrate uncertainty over marginal abatement 
cost curves (MACCs), Figure 3 displays MACC estimates from several models for the European 
road  transport  sector  in  2020.  The  differences  are  striking:  at  a  carbon  price  of  50$/tCO2e, 
abatement estimates differ by a factor of ten from 2% (Enerdata-POLES) to 20% (CE Delft) of 
business-as-usual emissions.    13 
On the global level, preference for quantity objectives is documented by the design of the 
Kyoto  Protocol  and  more  recently  the  2°C  objective  enshrined  in  the  Copenhagen  Accord 
(UNFCCC, 2009) which implies a cumulative carbon budget (Meinshausen et al., 2009; WBGU, 
2009). Regionally, the European Union has adopted legislation to reduce emissions by 20% relative 
to 2005 by 2020. The United States envisage 17% emission reductions below 2005 levels by 2020. 
The announcements by China and India to reduce carbon intensity of GDP by 40-45% and 20-25% 
below year 2005 levels by 2020 are also based on emission quantities rather prices. 
When a fixed carbon tax is used to manage a carbon budget and MACCs turn out to be 
higher than expected, there will be a shortfall in abatement and the policy objective is missed. Vice 
versa, if the marginal abatement cost curve turns out to be flatter than expected, the abatement 
objective will be exceeded.  
Clearly,  if  the  tax  rate  can  be  adjusted  over  time,  the  policymaker  can  ensure  that  a 
cumulative quantity target is achieved. But repeated adjustment of carbon taxes will likely involve 
delays, transaction costs, and political controversies. To avoid policy failure of carbon taxation in 
presence  of  uncertainty,  the  regulator  can  impement  international  flexibility  mechanisms  for 
compliance. For example, the EU climate package enables governments to use CDM credits for 
compliance  with  up  to  3%  of  their  year  2020  EU-emission  objectives  in  non-ETS  sectors.  In 
addition, EU countries can use statistical transfers of non-ETS sector reductions to comply with 
their reduction burdens in non-ETS sectors, essentially enabling government level emission trading 
(EC, 2009a). However, if the price of CDM credits or statistical transfers deviates from the carbon 
tax, this indicates that the policy configuration has been inefficient. In an economy-wide cap-and-
trade system, by contrast, the cap will ensure compliance with the policy objective, and trading will   14 
result in a uniform allowance price across all sectors. Hence, abatement is allocated in the most cost 
effective manner.  
With uncertainty over abatement costs, and simultaneous application of a fixed carbon tax in 
the road transport sector and cap-and-trade in other sectors will almost certainly lead to inefficiency 
as the tax and allowance price will diverge. When road transport fuels are generated in diverse fuel 
chains (e.g. crude oil refining, biofuel refining, power generation) such asymmetric carbon prices 
also imply intra-sector distortions, as transport technologies and modes will face different carbon 
prices  (Bühler  et  al.,  2009).  By  contrast,  an  economy-wide  cap-and-trade  system  automatically 
harmonizes sector carbon prices without need for adjustments by the regulator.  
The relevance of this argument clearly depends on the scale of the potential policy failure 
and inefficiency. If the errors in policy-making turn out to be small, and minor failures in achieving 
quantity targets can be tolerated or mitigated by using flexible mechanisms, the asymmetry between 
tax and trading will be weak.  
Illustrating  the  potential  order  of  magnitude  of  welfare  losses  from  sectorally  diverging 
marginal abatement costs, Böhringer et al. (2009) review three model-based analyses of the recent 
EU climate package. They find that asymmetric marginal abatement costs in EU ETS and non-ETS 
sectors as implied by the EU climate package raise year 2020 climate policy costs by 0.25-0.6% in 
terms of total welfare, or 25-30% above the cost of the efficient policy.  
To sum up, cap-and-trade is preferable because it ensures the attainment of quantitative 
policy objectives and features automatic dynamic harmonization of marginal abatement costs across 
all abatement options. 
   15 
4. Cap-and-trade design  
Practical implementation of cap-and-trade for any sector requires specification of a number of 
design elements (Brunner et al., 2010b). The choice of the point of regulation for road transport cap-
and-trade  has  received  the  most  attention  in  the  debate  (for  a  list  of  relevant  publications,  see 
Creutzig et al., 2010b). We revisit and extend this debate beyond the traditional gasoline and diesel 
fuel chains by also considering electricity, natural gas, hydrogen and biofuels (Section 4.1). Section 
4.2 briefly discusses the design of the cap, the allocation of allowance value, and regional flexibility 
with regard to the road transport sector.  
 
4.1 Point of regulation 
The point of regulation specifies where in the transport fuel supply chain emissions are 
monitored  and  emission  allowances  are  delivered  to  the  regulator.  Commodity  chains  can  be 
characterized  by  up-,  mid-  and  downstream  processes  and  actors.  For  road  transport  fuels  we 
distinguish the production of feedstocks, fuel production (e.g. refining, power generation, hydrogen 
production), distribution and storage, and vehicle fuel consumption. Feedstock production is the 
most 'upstream' and fuel consumption the most 'downstream' level in the product chain, with the 
remaining stages ranging in between (see Figure 3). 
Some (or parts) of fuel chains feature strict proportionality between the energy carrier and 
(‘embedded’)  greenhouse  gas  emissions:  The  amount  of  CO2  emissions  that  will  ultimately  be 
released  from  burning  gasoline  or  diesel  produced  from  one  barrel  of  crude  oil  can  be  easily 
calculated. By contrast, where fuel production (at biorefineries, power plants, or hydrogen plants) 
uses  heterogeneous  primary  energy  inputs  with  different  emission  factors  (coal,  gas,  oil, 
renewables,  different  biomass  stocks)  to  produce  a  homogenous  output  (electricity,  hydrogen,   16 
biofuels), only average emission values of the final fuel can be determined using system life-cycle 
analysis (Creutzig et al., 2010a).  
This  has  two  consequences  for  determining  the  optimal  point  of  regulation.  Strict 
proportionality of downstream fuel consumption to life-cycle GHG emission implies that any point 
of regulation can be chosen. However, homogenous final fuels from diverse upstream feedstocks 
require  coverage  to  be  sufficiently  far  upstream  to  ensure  there  is  an  incentive  for  switching 
between primary energy carriers with different emission factors.  
Another  important  aspect  is  that  in  competitive  markets  the  costs  of  surrendering  an 
allowance upstream (e.g. at the refinery) will be factored into the fuel price and shifted downstream. 
In Germany, for example, fuel taxes are collected at tax warehouses but their burden is shifted to 
consumers.  
Three principles govern the choice of the most effective and efficient point of regulation:  
1.  All fuel chain emissions should be covered and double counting excluded (effectiveness) 
2.  All emission reduction options in the sector should be incentivized (efficiency) 
3.  Transaction costs should be minimized by choosing the point in the fuel chain where the 
number regulated entities is minimal, where costs of monitoring and compliance are lowest, 
or where proper administrative structures are already in place 
With  three  principles,  four  potential  points  of  regulation  (feedstock  production,  fuel 
production, fuel storage and distribution, final consumption), and five fuel chains a comprehensive 
discussion needs to cover 60 facets. This is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, and we restrict 
the discussion to major issues in each fuel chain. Figure 3 provides an overview.  
The  fuel  chains  of  gasoline,  diesel  and  natural  gas  exhibit  structural  similarity.  CO2   17 
emissions  per  unit  energy  are  proportional  throughout  the  fuel  chain,  and  upstream  process 
emissions  e.g.  in  tar  sand  processing  or  oil  refining  may  be  covered  separately.  The  major 
abatement  options  are  switching  away  from  carbon  intensive  feedstocks  (e.g.  tar  sands)  and 
avoiding combustion of the final fuel altogether. Upstream regulation would require tracking of 
inputs  to  products  that  are  not  eventually  combusted  (e.g.  lubricants)  to  ensure  they  are  not 
burdened with the allowance price (Hargrave, 2000). Effectiveness and efficiency considerations 
enable regulation at any point in the fuel chain as long as upstream process emissions are covered 
separately, thus transaction cost considerations will be the decisive factor. Since a detailed analysis 
of the relative transaction costs of the potential points of regulation is not available and beyond the 
scope  of  this  study,  only  the  downstream  level  of  vehicles  is  excluded  from  the  set  of 
recommendable points of regulation as it would literally involve millions of actors. All other points 
of regulation are generally suitable for effective and efficient cap-and-trade inclusion. For fuels 
imported from regions that lack comparable carbon pricing systems, the proper point of regulation 





















Figure 3: Optimal point of regulation for different transport fuel chains.  Sources (data refer to the 
United States): CARB (2009), Hargrave (2000), NREL (2010), Stavins (2007). 
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Upstream coverage of fossil-based road transport fuels e.g. at the level of fuel refining is not 
only  widely  recommended  in  the  literature  (see  Kampmann  et  al.,  2008  for  a  review),  but  all 
legislative  proposals  for  cap-and-trade  coverage  of  gasoline  and  diesel  envisage  inclusion  of 
emissions at the level of fuel production (ACESA, 2009; Australian Government 2008; APA, 2010; 
California, 2009;). In the EU ETS, refinery process emissions are already covered (EC, 2003). 
Coverage at the feedstock production level–i.e. crude, natural gas and coal production–is considered 
an elegant approach which would enable a comprehensive economy-wide trading system at low 
administrative costs (Stavins, 2007). Alternatively, the distribution level (e.g. gas distributors, fuel 
tax  warehouses)  has  been  suggested  as  point  of  regulation  as  pre-existing  fuel  taxation 
administration structures may be harnessed to contain transaction costs (Bergmann et al., 2005; 
California, 2009).  
The hydrogen and electricity fuel chains also share crucial characteristics. Both involve a 
homogenous final energy product (electricity and hydrogen) that can be created from a wide range 
of feedstocks with different GHG emission factors (coal, gas, oil, renewables). Hence, switching to 
low-carbon primary energy inputs is only incentivized if the point of regulation is sufficiently far 
upstream at the level of feedstock or the inputs to fuel production. Up-stream regulation incentivizes 
agents endowed with relatively more options for emission reduction compare to agents at lower 
stages of a value chain. This implies that up-stream regulation is more cost-effective than down-
stream regulation. For electricity and hydrogen imported from regions that lack comparable carbon 
pricing systems, the proper point of regulation is at the import of the product with average emission 
factors of fuel production systems in the country of origin have to be applied as the best proxy for 
accurate accounting.    20 
Biofuels represent the most significant challenge for inclusion to cap-and-trade due to the 
substantial technical greenhouse gas accounting difficulties (Creutzig and Kammen, 2009; Creutzig 
et  al.,  2010a).  Emissions  associated  with  biomass  production  will  differ  across  crops,  regions, 
farmers and even fields. Accurate monitoring of emissions at the farmer and field level would 
involve significant transaction costs making this approach infeasible. In addition, even if such a 
system was put in place in one region but not on a global scale, indirect global effects of domestic 
biomass  production  still  arise  as  world  agrarian  market  prices  will  be  affected  by  domestic 
production inducing changes in global emission levels that depend on market dynamics and land-
use and land-use change patterns. Hence, life-cycle accounting differentiated by crops and regions 
at the input level of biofuel production facilities appears as the second best point of regulation. In 
analogy to electricity and hydrogen, this would enable switching across more or less GHG-intensive 
biomass  feedstocks  which  would  not  be  possible  with  regulation  of  homogenous  biofuels  (e.g. 
ethanol) further downstream. Imported biofuels from regions without a comparable carbon pricing 
system have to be accounted by using average values from life-cycle analyses.  
Another  proposal  not  investigated  here  includes  vehicle  manufacturers  into  cap-and-trade 
system by attributing their vehicle sales with expected lifetime emissions and requiring delivery of 
allowances from the manufacturer at the time of vehicle sales - effectively frontloading allowance 
expenditures for fuels for the consumer (Winkelman et al., 2000). This approach suffers from two 
fundamental problems. First, it is inefficient because it sets no incentive to adjust driving behavior 
and  fuel  production.  Second,  attributing  lifetime  emissions  to  vehicles  requires  cumbersome 
definition of uniform emission factors for fuels and cars. Policy design is further complicated by the 
need of multi-year trading periods to enable car manufacturers surrendering allowances for vehicle 
emissions several years ahead.    21 
In summary, there is some flexibility in choosing the appropriate point of regulation without 
compromising effectiveness and efficiency if (1) coverage is comprehensive and avoids double 
counting, (2) all mitigation options are incentivized, and (3) transaction costs remain low. The 
feedstock  and  fuel  production  levels  are  recommendable  points  of  regulation  for  all  of  the 
considered  fuel  chains,  except  for  biomass  where  only  refineries  and  life-cycle  accounting  are 
recommended due to prohibitive transaction costs at the farming level. While it is theoretically 
possible to determine different points of regulation for different economic sectors (Hargrave, 2000), 
consistency is necessary for avoiding loopholes and double-pricing. 
 
4.2 Other design features 
Two  aspects  are  essential  when  determining  the  cap  of  an  ETS  that  covers  road 
transportation. First, the cap needs to be in line with regional and global emission reduction targets. 
Second, if a cap-and-trade system covers only part of an economy’s emissions, the cap needs to be 
set so as to ensure an efficient effort-sharing between ETS and non-ETS sectors (Böhringer et al., 
2009). As efficiency implies harmonized marginal abatement costs across sectors, adding a non-
ETS sector to an ETS should actually not impact allowance prices.  
Allocation  of  allowance  value  has  an  efficiency  and  distributional  dimension.  Perverse 
incentives from free allocation–e.g. when future free allocation is based upon current emission 
levels–need to be avoided. Auctioning is widely preferred by economists as this method does not 
suffer from such shortcomings (Hepburn et al. 2006). Free allocation is sometimes used as a subsidy 
to protect trade-and carbon-price exposed sectors (such as steel and aluminum) from international 
competitors  not  facing  comparable  constraints  (EC,  2010).  This  aspect  is  not  relevant  for  road 
transportation as the final economic activity is not subject to international trade.    22 
In competitive markets companies will pass on the opportunity costs of using allowances to 
final  consumers  irrespective  of  the  allocation  method  (Sijm  et  al.,  2006).  If  companies  receive 
allowances for free they increase their revenue by increasing product prices without having to pay 
for allowances, realizing so-called windfalls profits. This effect would occur if e.g. transport fuel 
refineries and importers were included to a cap-and-trade system and received allowances for free. 
Fuel prices would rise and generate additional revenues for these actors. Auctioning of allowances 
eliminates  windfall  profits,  and  the  revenue  can  be  used  for  a  variety  of  purposes,  including 
ensuring a progressive distribution of the policy burden by compensating consumers accordingly 
(Burtraw et al., 2009).  
  Regional flexibility is provided by linking regional cap-and-trade systems or by enabling 
access to credits e.g. from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Tuerk et al., 2009). Linking 
promises efficiency gains if permit prices differ across regions and harmonization of allowance 
prices across cap-and-trade systems eliminates industrial competitiveness concerns by ‘levelling the 
carbon playing field’ (Flachsland et al., 2009). When linking to crediting schemes it is paramount to 
ensure additionality. This means that emissions need to be reduced below business-as-usual levels, 
i.e. credits shall not be issued to rewards emission reductions that would occur anyways (Schneider, 
2007). Linking cap-and-trade systems of major automobile markets such as the United States and 
Europe would ensure harmonized carbon prices across these markets, which facilitates research, 
development and deployment planning of international firms.  
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5. Economic impacts: the European case 
5.1 Concepts, data and scenarios 
  Marginal abatement cost curves are a standard tool for analyzing price and quantity effects 
in  carbon  markets  and  are  widely  used  to  analyze  the  integration  of  regional  trading  systems 
(Anger, 2008; Criqui et al., 1999; Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; Stankeviciute et al., 2008). The basic 
concepts for analyzing regional links or integration of sectors are identical. Figure 4 displays four 
marginal abatement cost curves for the European road transport sector and one aggregate MACC 
for the EU ETS sectors.  
Marginal abatement cost curves can be derived in several ways which is reflected in the 
differences across models (Clapp et al., 2010). Important choices concern the model structure (e.g. 
top-down versus bottom-up, scope of considered technologies and behavioral reactions), baseline 
assumptions  (e.g.  energy  prices,  economic  growth,  technological  innovation)  and  policy 
assumptions regarding the baseline.  
Among the MACCs applied in the analysis below, only the CE Delft road transport curve 
explicitly includes demand side responses while McKinsey and AIM/Enduse do not include this 
option. Including behavioral responses into the other curves would flatten all of them (see Figure 2). 
Also, none of the transport MACCs takes the 2009 EU climate package into account, which would 
unambiguously shift curves downwards (see Figure 10 and the discussion in Section 5.3). Finally, 
none of the models takes the world economic crisis into account. This would also shift marginal 
cost  curves  downwards,  as  year  2020  baseline  emission  levels  are  reduced  and  a  lower  price 
incentive is required to yield a given level of emissions.   24 
  Figure 4: 
Comparison of marginal abatement cost curves for year 2020 EU road transport sector from CE Delft 
(Blom  et  al., 2007) ,  Enerdat a-POLES (Enerdata, 2010) ,  McKi nsey and AIM/ Enduse ( Cl app et  al., 
2009) and an aggregate EU ETS curve (Blom et al., 2007).  
 
When modeling road transport inclusion to the EU ETS, the MACCs from Figure 4 need to 
be modified to reflect the EU ETS link to the CDM (EC, 2004). This regional flexibility can be 
modeled  by  adding  the  permitted  volumes  and  prices  of  credits  to  the  schedule  of  available 
abatement options (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Including limited international credit supply to a marginal abatement cost curve. Credits   25 
enable  access  to  additional  abatement  options  in  other  countries,  and  the  price  of  this  abatement 
option is set by the world market. The formulation here assumes that  demand for credits does not 
impact the world market price, thus the credit abatement 'lever' is horizontal. 
 
 
The EU has specified a complicated set of rules determining the quantity of credits available 
in the EU ETS in the 2013-2020 trading period (EC, 2009b). Our estimate for credit use is the mean 
of the average annual estimates summarized in Capoor and Ambrosi (2009, p.8), which amounts to 
150Mt per year. A CDM world market price of 30$/t is assumed. As a new sector, road transport 
would  increase  the  total  amount  of  credits  available  in  the  EU  ETS.  The  reformed  EU  ETS 
Directive suggests  that road transport would increase the amount of available credits in the EU ETS 
by 4.5% of year 2020 road emissions (EC, 2009b, Article 11a). In the scenario where EU emission 
reductions are enhanced from 20% to 30% relative to 1990, we assume that 50% of the additional 
abatement effort can be covered by credits.  
Figure 6 illustrates how MACCs enable the analysis of price and quantity effects of adding 
sectors to an existing cap-and-trade system. The horizontal axis depicts the total abatement required 
by both sectors. In our example, the section left of Qset represents the abatement target for the ETS 
already in place, while the section to the right of Qset denotes the abatement target for the road 
transport  sector  to  be  included.  The  ETS  pre-link  allowance  price  PETS  is  determined  by  the 
intersection  of  the  EU  ETS  curve  and  the  policy  target  (Qset),  while  the  transport  sector  pre-
integration MAC is given by Ptrans. The optimal allocation of abatement Q
* and the corresponding 
optimal allowance price level P
* result at the intersection of the MACCs as indicated in the right 
hand panel. The aggregate efficiency gain is indicated by the shaded area.    26 
 
     
Figure 6. Pre- and post-integration carbon market equilibria and efficiency gains from including road 
transport.  The  left  figure  indicates  asymmetric  marginal  abatement  costs  prior  to  road  transport 
inclusion. The right figure indicates the direction of price changes after integration, with the shaded 
area denoting the efficiency gain from trade. 
 
The assumptions on abatement targets in the default policy scenario are based on the EU-wide 
GHG  reduction  target  of  20%  below  1990  levels  by  2020  (EC,  2009a,  b).  The  European 
Commission (EC, 2008) reports that EU policymakers adopted an implicit sector emission reduction 
burden-sharing where the EU ETS sectors need to reduce their year 2020 emissions by 21% below 
2005 levels. The transport sector is supposed to reduce emissions 7% below its 2005 level by 2020 
(EC, 2008). The Commission claims that these are the efficient burden-sharing levels as determined 
in  modeling  exercises,  i.e.  marginal  abatement  costs  in  these  calculations  are  supposed  to  be 
harmonized across sectors. Table 1 summarizes historic emissions, future projections, sector caps 
and abatement targets for the EU ETS and the considered road transport MACCs.   27 
 
Road Transport 
Unit: Mt CO2e 
EU ETS 






2005 emissions  2014  895  895  895  895 
2020 BAU emissions  2363  1116  893  1000  1100 
2020 cap in 20% 
scenario 
1591  832  832  832  832 
2020 abatement below 
BAU, absolute  
771  284  61  168  268 
2020 abatement below 
BAU  
33%  25%  7%  17%  24% 
 
Table 1: 2005 emissions from EU ETS and road transport sectors, baseline emission projections from 
different models, sector policy targets under the 20% EU-wide reduction target, and corresponding 
abatement targets for the EU ETS and transport sectors (in MtCO2e). Sources: Historical year 2005 
emissions EEA (2010); year 2020 BAU projections same as Figure 4. 
 
A scenario with 30% reduction below year 1990 emission is investigated in addition to the 
20% default policy case (EC, 2010). For this enhanced EU effort we assume that EU ETS and road 
transport uniformly increase their abatement by 50% above the effort required compared to the 
default scenario. Thus, modified ETS and road transport reduction targets are 31.5% and 10.5% 
below year 2005 emission levels, respectively. In a third policy scenario, we investigate the impact 
of the 20% default policy scenario while excluding the link to crediting schemes.  
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5.2 Results 
Figure 7 displays the CE Delft and Enerdata-POLES results for the 20% policy default case 
(see Appendix Ia-c for all scenarios and models). Figure 8 summarizes the price changes in the EU 
ETS and the road transport sector, and Figure 9 shows how abatement quantities shift between 
sectors.  
 
     
Figure 7: Economic impacts of integrating EU road transport into the EU ETS by 2020 using CE Delft 
(left) and Enerdata-POLES (right) road transport MACCs. Pre-integration prices and quantities are 
determined by the intersection of the MACCs with the vertical line which indicates sector abatement 
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Figure 8: Price effects of EU road transport integration into the EU ETS in 2020 for three policy 
scenarios and four models. The figure displays pre- and post-integration marginal abatement costs in 
the EU ETS and transport sector. Bars exceeding the scale indicate that the abatement target cannot 







Figure 9: Change in abatement quantities across sectors when including EU road transport into the 
EU ETS in 2020 for three policy scenarios. Positive values mark increased abatement activity in a 
sector and vice versa. Where the changes for EU ETS and transport sectors do not cancel out, the 
quantity  objective  is  not  achieved  prior  to  transport  integration  because  models  lack  sufficient 
abatement options. 
 
As  the  perhaps  most  striking  result,  in  the  default  20%  policy  scenario  the  EU  ETS 
allowance price remains unchanged for all models (Figure 8). This is in contradiction to previous 
MACC-based assessments usually concluding that road transport integration to the EU ETS would   31 
raise the EUA price (Blom et al., 2007; COWI, 2007; Hartwig et al., 2008; Holmgren et al., 2006). 
Integration of road transport would actually reduce the amount of abatement required from EU ETS 
sectors for all but the McKinsey model (Figure 9).  
This result can be explained by the combination of (i) the volume of abatement potentials in 
road  transport  as  represented  by  the  MACCs,  (ii)  regional  flexibility  in  meeting  part  of  the 
abatement target with CDM credits, and (iii) the 7 % road transport reduction target below 2005 
levels  not  representing  a  very  large  challenge  for  EU  road  transportation  given  the  scope  for 
domestic and foreign abatement.  
The pre-integration EUA price of 80$/t for the year 2020 is quite high compared to the 37$/t 
reported by EC (2008) modeling, or private sector estimates of 37-50$/t reported by Capoor and 
Ambrosi (2009, p.8). This reflects the rather conservative EU ETS cost curve estimate by CE Delft 
(see Blom et al., 2007). 
In the 30% reduction scenario, the same picture emerges except for the McKinsey cost 
curve. In this model the constraint becomes so tight that the EUA price needs to rise to incentivize 
more expensive abatement options in the EU ETS. It is worth noting that the McKinsey model does 
not take demand side reductions into account. Including this abatement option into the model would 
flatten and extend the marginal abatement cost curve and would dampen the EUA price increase 
(see Figure 2).   
In  this  context  it  is  worth  taking  into  account  that  the  economic  crisis  has  eased  the 
conditions for meeting a 30% reduction target (EC, 2010). The MACCs in this analysis would 
reflect the economic crisis by shifting downwards, thereby dampening impacts on allowance prices.    32 
The  third  policy  scenario  (20%  reduction  target  without  access  to  CDM)  leads  to 
substantially different outcomes. Except for the CE Delft curve, EU ETS prices rise and the ETS 
sectors need to deliver additional abatement. Even for the CE Delft case the pre-link EUA price 
level is higher than in the default scenario because more expensive domestic abatement options 
need to be harnessed as international emission trading is not available. For the McKinsey model the 
aggregate  target  is  not  feasible  because  it  does  not    no  include  sufficient  domestic  abatement 
potentials. This scenario illustrates the importance of regional flexibility for containing EUA prices.  
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, with the EUA price remaining 
constant in case of road transport inclusion to the EU ETS in the 20% default policy scenario in all 
models, concerns over carbon leakage from transport inclusion appear less well-founded than is 
often suggested in the literature.  
Second,  the  relatively  moderate  sector  differences  in  pre-integration  MACs  and  the 
correspondingly modest changes in sectoral abatement in case of transport integration in the default 
policy scenario indicate that EU policymakers perform well in terms of sector burden-sharing. Note, 
however, that the instruments for the road transport sector are not market-based and hence the 
abatement options in this sector do not consistently face the shadow price of emissions. Therefore, it 
can be expected that road transport inclusion would still deliver efficiency gains.  
Third,  the  McKinsey  and  AIM/Enduse  models  ignore  demand  side  responses  and  only 
represent technical abatement options. Taking behavioral responses into account would lower the 
transport  MAC  curves.  Therefore  EUA  price  increases  for  these  curves  would  be  lower  than 
indicated  here.  In  a  similar  vein,  taking  into  account  the  world  economic  recession  reduces 
business-as-usual emissions and would work towards reducing EUA price levels and changes in all 
of the considered policy scenarios.   33 
Finally,  this  analysis  does  not  include  non-price  policies  as  embodied  by  the  recent  EU 
climate policy package (e.g. EC, 2009c). A detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, estimates of the impact of non-price road transport policies on abatement in the European 
Union, the United States and California are discussed in the next section.  
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5.3 Interaction with non-market policies 
  As  noted  in  Section  2.1,  non-market  policies  will  induce  abatement  even  in  absence  of 
market-based policies. In the MACC framework this can be represented as a shift in the marginal 
abatement  cost  curve  as  shown  in  Figure  10.  In  a  cap-and-trade  system,  standards  that  trigger 
abatement options that either cost more than the equilibrium allowance price P
* or that do not 
respond to an allowance price due to some market failure will have the effect of reducing the 
equilibrium allowance price to P
s.  
 
Figure 1: Standards shift the marginal abatement cost curve downwards and can reduce the allowance 
price in cap-and-trade systems.  
    
Creutzig et al. (2010b [calculation is attached as Appendix II since Creutzig et al. 2010b is 
forthcoming]) calculate that EU non-market policies such as vehicle emission intensity standards, 
the Fuel Quality Directive and measures including improved air conditioning and tires will reduce 
EU road transport emissions in 2020 to around 11% of the 2005 level, despite moderate growth of 
transport volumes (EC 2009c). This would not only exceed the 7% year 2020 reduction target 
below 2005 emissions assumed in the default policy scenario above, but also the 10.5% target 
assumed for the enhanced 30% EU-wide effort. In the United States–assuming the revised US   35 
CAFÉ standards will remain constant from 2016 to 2020–vehicle efficiency standards will induce 
road transport emissions to drop by 3% relative to 2005 levels in 2020.  
  What does this mean for the EU ETS integration of the European road transport and the 
results  derived  above?  As  standards  have  the  effect  of  shifting  the  road  transport  MACCs 
downwards, this unambiguously works towards reducing allowance prices in the integrated trading 
system. In the same vein, it will work towards reducing the level of abatement required in the EU 
ETS sectors. Therefore, the analyses in the previous section tends to overestimate the increase of the 




Well-designed market-based instruments such as carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems have 
several  advantages  over  non-market  climate  policies  for  the  road  transport  sector.  Their  merits 
include  the  provision  of  abatement  incentives  across  all  available  emission  reduction  options 
(within and across sectors) at harmonized marginal costs of abatement, the elimination of rebound 
effects, a level playing field for competing technologies, and lower informational requirements. 
Therefore, market-based climate policies fill an important policy gap in the current road transport 
policy  portfolio  that  is  dominated  by  non-market  instruments  in  many  regions  including  the 
European Union and the United States. Where carbon price signals are ineffective due to market 
failures, non-market policies continue to play an important complementary role.  
Cap-and-trade and carbon taxes are equivalent instruments in a simple analytic framework. 
However, cap-and-trade is the favorable instrument if marginal abatement costs are uncertain and 
policymakers prefer quantitative emission targets, or if a cap-and-trade system has already been   36 
implemented in other sectors of the economy. If errors in setting a carbon tax turn out to be small or 
flexibility mechanisms are implemented to contain the magnitude of error, the asymmetry between 
tax and trading will be weak.  
An upstream point of regulation at the level of feedstock or fuel production (e.g. refineries 
and power plants) is recommended to ensure effectiveness, efficiency and low transaction costs in 
presence of diversifying fuel chains. Biofuels exhibit particular challenges due to the difficulty of 
monitoring emissions from geographically spread biomass production. Auctioning of allowances is 
preferable to free allocation to ensure efficiency and avoid windfall profits. Well-designed links to 
other  cap-and-trade  systems  will  ‘level  the  carbon  playing  field’  across  the  linked  regions  and 
enhance efficiency. Gains from trade also motivate links to emission crediting schemes.  
A comparative analysis of integrating the road transport sector into the EU ETS in 2020 
reveals that in the present EU climate policy configuration (20% economy-wide reductions below 
2005 levels by 2020) no allowance price changes would result from adding the sector to the EU 
ETS. This can be explained by the interplay of the volumes of abatement that are available in the 
road transport sector, regional flexibility exhibited by the access to CDM credits, and the relatively 
modest  emission  reduction  target  for  the  road  transport  sector  that  is  envisaged  by  EU 
policymakers. Therefore, the widespread concern over carbon leakage from trade-exposed EU ETS 
sectors in case of rising allowance prices due to road transport inclusion is not confirmed by our 
results.   37 
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Appendix II – Calculating the impact of non-price policies  
[this Appendeix is only included to submitted paper;,the text is part of a referenced publication 
which is due for August/September 2010] 
II.1 European Union 
The current EU regulation of emission intensity of new vehicles dates from April 2009 (EC, 
2009c) and, hence, has not been included in previous models of transport inclusion into emission 
trading.  The  regulation  mandates  the  average  carbon  emissions  from  newly  sold  vehicles  to 
decrease from 167gCO2/km in 2005 to 130gCO2/km in 2015, and to 95gCO2/km in 2020 (see also 
chapter 3). This corresponds to 40% reduction in emissions intensity of new vehicles sold by 2020.  
 
How large is the emission reduction in the transport sector in the EU in 2020 given by this 
and other policies? New vehicles, of course, do not substitute the current car fleet. A good working 
assumption is a 10% turnover rate every year. The question can be broken down in different parts. 
What were the average emissions per vehicle in 2005? Data is available for the year 2000, with 
average emissions per vehicle in 2000 being 186 gCO2/km (EC 2000). Emission intensity of newly 
sold vehicles between 2000 and 2005 were relatively constant at around 167 gCO2/km (An and 
Sauer,  2007).  Assuming  a  10%  annual  turnover  rate,  the  average  2005  fleet  average  was  178 
gCO2/km.  
 
Average emission intensities for 2020 are more difficult to estimate. Newly sold cars after 
2015 will have less than 130 gCO2/km on average, as the average heads towards the 95gCO2/km 
value of 2020. These vintages may constitute around 40% of the overall fleet. Linear interpolation   57 
of fuel economy  values between 2015 and 2020 then yields an average fleet intensity of 125 
gCO2/km in 2020. 
 
Additional  measures,  such  as  improved  air  conditioning  and  tires,  but  also  biofuels  are 
expected to deliver another intensity reduction of 10 gCO2/km until 2015. To be on the conservative 
side, we omit the car-related measures. We do include the more specific Fuel Quality Directive 
COM-2007-18 which requires 6% reduction in CO2e of transportation fuels from 2010 to 2020 (EC 
2009c). At the same time, total road transport demand is projected to rise from 4700 Gpkm in 2005 
to 5800 Gpkm, an increase of 24% (EC 2008b). We omit any rebound effects. Taking together, 
carbon emissions from road transport (not including other transport, such as air traffic) will be 
reduced by around 11% in 2020. This would even exceed our assumed road transport reduction 
target of 10.5% in presence of a 30% economy-wide EU abatement target. This result may be 
overly optimistic for four reasons 
 
1.  The extrapolation is linear in annual improvement of fuel economy. However, car 
manufacturers may choose, according to current regulation, to back-off investments 
till the 2015 or 2020 deadlines respectively.  
2.  Car renewal rate is estimated to be around 10%. In recession times, the car renewal 
rate could be lower. However, total transport volumes would also drop.  
3.  Rebound effects are omitted here. They can be regarded to be part of the overall 
uncertaintyin growth of travel demand.   58 
3.  The environmental effectiveness of the Fuel Quality Directive COM-2007-18 is not 
guaranteed due to the current accounting procedures that does not foresee detailed 
life cycle analysis including indirect land use emissions. 
 
However, even if these caveats reduce overall GHG reduction, current EU regulation seem 
to guarantee that at least the 7% reduction target (below 2005 levels by 2020) is achieved even 
without carbon pricing.  
 
II.2 United States 
 
The United States has similarly ambitious targets for fuel economy in relative terms, i.e. 
taken the currently more inefficient vehicle fleet into account. Including extra measures such as 
improved  air  conditioning,  tire  pressure  and  biofuels,  the  revised  CAFÉ  standard  foresees  the 
average  fuel  efficiency  of  newly  sold  vehicles  to  increase  from  221  gCO2/km  in  2005  to  155 
gCO2/km in 2020. For the calculation it is assumed that mandated fuel economy remains constant 
from 2016 to 2020. With a fleet renewal rate of 10%, and average fuel economy of 245 gCO2/km in 
2005,  the  average  fuel  economy  in  2020  in  the  US  is  then  projected  to  be  186  gCO2/km, 
corresponding to a total improvement of 24% relative to 2005. At the same time, US vehicle miles 
travelled  are  expected  to  increase  by  27%  (EIA  2008).  Given  this  projected  development  and 
policies, and omitting rebound effects, overall GHG emission reduction by 2020 in road transport is 
3% relative to 2005.  
 